Classic Films and Historic Landmarks: Protecting America's Film Heritage from Digital Alteration, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 185 (1999)

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COMMENTS

CLASSIC FILMS AND HISTORIC LANDMARKS: PROTECTING AMERICA'S FILM HERITAGE FROM DIGITAL ALTERATION

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Film is a uniquely American art form: we brought it to life, we made it talk, we used it to address our deepest social concerns. Classic feature films are a vital part of America's living heritage. They have become one of the most potent voices through which one generation speaks to the next.¹

INTRODUCTION

Cinema is the most influential art form of this century. Individual films are irreplaceable records of American culture and history. Recent years have witnessed a groundswell of both critical and public appreciation of the importance of our film heritage. Yet, classic films are in greater danger today than ever before.

New digital technology used in modern feature filmmaking has made nearly undetectable alterations to old films a reality.² Recent television commercials have used digital technology to

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² The scope of this Comment is limited to possible alterations from digital technology. It does not extend to the insertion of commercials, content editing, and other changes made to accommodate films to television broadcast. Nor does this Comment extend to colorization or 'pan and scan,' the process by which feature films are formatted to fit television screens. See THE FOCAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FILM AND TELEVISION TECHNIQUES 281 (1981) (giving the projected image area for contemporary films as .825 or .839 and the area reproduced on the television screen as .792). Though anathema to film lovers, these processes are damaging primarily to the aesthetic value of the film, and only secondarily to its historical verity.
insert consumer products into scenes excerpted from Hollywood classics. Picture Judah Ben-Hur, who once competed in a chariot race against Messala, his mortal enemy and the cause of his family's tragic misfortunes, racing against a Pontiac Sunfire.³ Picture Errol Flynn enjoying “Miller Time” in the Spanish galley where he and his comrades were enslaved.⁴ Picture Fred Astaire dancing with a Dirt Devil vacuum cleaner.⁵ To date, only film excerpts have been altered. However, the technology is equally capable of altering scenes within films themselves.

The range of possible alterations is practically limitless and includes product placement, “correction” of racist or other objectionable material, and changes to the story to make the film more commercial.⁶ Is it only a matter of time before Jimmy Stewart drinks Coca-Cola in It's A Wonderful Life,⁷ Al Jolson sings “Mammy” in whiteface in The Jazz Singer,⁸ and Ingrid Bergman

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⁴. THE SEA HAWK (Warner Brothers 1940).

⁵. ROYAL WEDDING (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1951). Since sales of “Dirt Devil Broom Vacs” tripled during the three weeks the commercial aired in January 1997, it is likely that television viewers will see Astaire dancing with more vacuums in the future. Jeanne Whalen, Dirt Devil, ADVERTISING AGE, June 30, 1997, at 6.


⁷. IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE (RKO/Liberty Films 1946). Using digital technology, owners of old television shows now have the ability to sell “market-specific product placement in TV reruns. An episode of Home Improvement’ airing in Chicago, for instance, could feature Tim Allen using a toolbox with a Menard's logo, while the same episode, airing in Miami, might have him reaching for the same one featuring the logo of a South Florida chain.” Julia Keller, It All Ads Up, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 24, 1999, § 5, at 3.

⁸. THE JAZZ SINGER (Warner Brothers 1927). The Jazz Singer is a silent film with sound sequences, including several of Jolson's signature songs and one dialogue sequence. DICTIONARY OF FILMS, supra note 3, at 432. Although it is neither the first film to be released with a synchronized score nor the first
stays behind with Humphrey Bogart in Casablanca? No legal means exist today to prevent these or similar alterations to even the most revered classics of America's film heritage.¹⁰

The preservation of another part of America's cultural heritage, the "built environment," began too late to save many important landmarks.¹¹ Buildings, like films, reflect popular culture to a much greater degree than do works of fine art. Unlike great books or paintings, great films and buildings are rarely the product of a single artistic vision uninfluenced by commercial concerns. Cinema and architecture are collaborative ventures dependent on available technology, funding, materials, technical expertise, and public approbation. Today, society recognizes the cultural value of buildings and aggressively preserves the built environment through landmark laws.¹² Society has an equally strong interest in protecting the integrity of its film heritage.¹³

Part I of this Comment will begin with an explanation of how digital technology works and will continue with a discussion of three different rights: the copyright, the moral right, and the cultural property right. Part I will also describe the National Film Preservation Act and compare it with the National Historic Preservation Act. Part II will discuss the inherent limitations of attempting to protect films through either copyright law or moral rights law. Part II will then explore the advantages of founding legal protection of America's film heritage upon society's cultural

“all-talking” picture, people remember The Jazz Singer as the first sound film because of its enormous popular impact. Id.

9. CASABLANCA (Warner Brothers 1942); see Craig A. Wagner, Note, Motion Picture Colorization, Authenticity, and the Elusive Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628, 628-29 (1989) (posing an alternative “happy” ending to Casablanca as an example of the possibilities of digital technology). It's A Wonderful Life, The Jazz Singer, and Casablanca are all included in the National Film Registry. Film Registry, supra note 3.

10. Scholars often observe that new technologies highlight deficiencies in the law. Garrett D. Blanchfield, Jr., Comment, Black and White (and Red All Over): 'Colorization' in the Courts and in the Government, 10 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 59, 59 (1989). In the past, film lovers have been most concerned with colorization, the process by which film owners add color to black and white feature films. From 1988-90, at the height of the debate over colorization, law journals published at least 10 articles on the subject. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 9, at 712-13, 715 (proposing an amendment to the Copyright Act that would recognize the moral right of the film director, producer, and principal screenwriter to prevent material alterations, such as colorization).


13. Wagner, supra note 9, at 649.
property rights. Part III will propose statutory protection of films inspired by historic landmarks laws.

I. COPYRIGHT, MORAL RIGHTS, AND CULTURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THREE OPTIONS FOR PROTECTION

A film owner can use digital technology to alter a film in many ways. Film artists and their supporters continue to call for legal protection of artistic rights to limit the film owner's ability to make alterations. Society's cultural property rights offer an alternative means for protecting America's film heritage. Congress recognized the compelling public interest in the preservation of America's film heritage by enacting the National Film Preservation Act. A. How Digital Technology Works

While a digital image and a photograph may look alike to the human eye, they are as different from each other as a photograph and an oil painting. A photograph is an analog, or continuous

representation of an image, while a digital image is composed of discrete points, called pixels. A computer programmer creates a digital image by dividing a picture into color-coded pixels of uniform size; the programmer assigns an integer representing a given intensity to each pixel to color-code it. The computer stores the array of integers, called a raster grid, and "interprets" the grid to reproduce the image. Once the programmer converts an analog image to digital information, the programmer can manipulate the image by removing, adding, or shifting points around.

Society trusts photographs and film because, it is said, "pictures don't lie." In the future, an image's "truth" may be uncertain. Director George Lucas captured filmmakers' fears of the possibilities of the new technology: "we may live to see [our motion picture creations] re-cast with stars we never directed, uttering dialogue we never wrote—all in support of goals and masters we never imagined we would serve."

B. Copyright and the Moral Right

Most American feature films are under copyright, which is a property right in a work of art. The studios that produced the films hold the copyrights. In contrast, the artist holds the moral

composed of a finite amount of information. Id.

18. Id. at 4-5.
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 7.
22. MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 24.
23. Digital technology exploded into the public eye with the critical and commercial success of Forrest Gump. MARK COTTA VAZ & PATRICIA ROSE DUIGNAN, INDUSTRIAL LIGHT AND MAGIC: INTO THE DIGITAL REALM 247 (1996). The filmmakers inserted the title character into archival footage in which he appeared to interact with, among others, Presidents John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon. Id. at 253-54. The filmmakers used a two-dimensional technique in which they scanned the archival footage into a computer and then manipulated it. Erin Giacoppo, Note, Avoiding the Tragedy of Frankenstein: The Application of the Right of Publicity to the Use of Digitally Reproduced Actors in Film, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 601, 605 (1997). For the scene with Nixon, the filmmakers digitally altered the president's facial movements to bring his "performance" into harmony with the script. VAZ, supra, at 254; cf. MITCHELL, supra note 17, at 16-17 (giving examples of digital alteration of photographs). Predictions of the digital resurrection of actors no longer seem fanciful. More than one writer has already addressed the legal consequences that would flow from casting dead movie stars in contemporary feature films. See, e.g., Giacoppo, supra, at 605-08 (discussing the technical process used to reanimate dead actors).
26. Wagner, supra note 9, at 656.
right in a work and retains it when the work is sold. The U.S. does not currently recognize moral rights of film artists.

1. U.S. Copyright Law

The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." Original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression are eligible for copyright protection. The copyright includes exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute the work, to perform and display it, and to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work. The Copyright Clause exists primarily to serve the public interest in the arts. Creating a property right for artists in their creations stimulates creative activity that in turn benefits the public. The limited term of copyright protection also benefits the public because it promotes wide dissemination of the work following the term's expiration.

The 1909 Copyright Act granted a twenty-eight year copyright term for motion pictures. The copyright owner could renew the copyright for an additional twenty-eight years at the expiration of the original term. The total length of possible copyright protection therefore was fifty-six years. The 1976 Copyright Act, as amended by the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, extends the copyright term for motion pictures to ninety-five years. The 1976 Act also adds an

27. Id. at 688.
31. Id. § 106. A colorized version of a film is a derivative work that is eligible for independent copyright protection. Wagner, supra note 9, at 652-53.
32. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954); accord Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (stating that "[t]he sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors").
34. 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.05[D], at 66.16-17 (1999) [hereinafter Nimmer].
additional term to subsisting copyrights—to create a uniform ninety-five year term of protection for films made before and after the act took effect. The 1976 Act gives the owner of a motion picture, in its first term of protection on January 1, 1978, an additional term of sixty-seven years. For a motion picture in its renewal term on the effective date of the Copyright Term Extension Act, the Act extends the copyright term to ninety-five years from the original copyright date. Thus, silent films made before 1922 are now in the public domain, while most films of the sound era are under copyright.

Under copyright law, motion pictures fall into the special category of “works made for hire.” A work for hire is defined as “a work specially ordered or commissioned... as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work.” The “author” of a work for hire is the employer who commissioned the work, rather than the artist or artists who created it. Thus, in the case of a motion picture, the studio that produced the film holds the copyright.

2. Moral Rights Theory

In an effort to limit the copyright owner’s ability to alter a film, many film artists advocate U.S. recognition of filmmakers’ moral rights. The doctrine of moral rights originated in France in the mid-1800s. Many European countries recognize some

39. Id. § 304(b).
40. Cinema was born in France in 1895. GERALD MAST, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE MOVIES 21 (5th ed. 1992). By the end of World War I, the American film industry had become the dominant industry in the world, both artistically and commercially. Id. at 94-95. D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation (1915) inaugurated the era of American silent feature filmmaking, and The Jazz Singer (1927) heralded its demise. Id. at 67, 185. Although studios continued to release silent films through 1929, production of “talkies” began in earnest after the success of The Jazz Singer. Id. at 190.
42. Id. In general, any “work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment” is a work for hire. Id.
43. Id. § 201(b). As the “author,” the employer “owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright” unless there is a contrary written agreement between the parties. Id. Architects also have very limited rights under the copyright act. Gerstenblith, supra note 12, at 435. Copyright law considers architects, like filmmakers, to have been fully paid at the time their work is completed, unlike writers and visual artists who must rely on profits from later sales of either the original work or of copies. Id. at 446.
44. Wagner, supra note 9, at 656.
45. McDonough, supra note 28, at 469.
variation of moral rights. The Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne) also grants
significant moral rights protection to artists.

In contrast to copyright, moral rights are personal to the
artist. The artist retains moral rights in the work even after
selling it; retention of the moral right is independent of copyright
ownership. The most important component of the moral right is
the right of integrity. This enables the artistic author to prevent
substantial alterations to the work. However, possession of a
moral right does not compel an artist to exercise it.

Protecting the artist's livelihood is the most common
justification for recognizing the artist's moral rights. Material
alteration of a work has a negative impact on the quality of the

"spiritual," "non-economic," and "personal" are close in meaning. NIMMER,
supra note 34, § 8D.01A, at 4.

47. Janine V. McNally, Comment, Congressional Limits on Technological
Alterations to Film: The Public Interest and the Artists' Moral Right, 5 HIGH

48. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Sept. 9, 1886 (Paris text 1971) art. 6bis [hereinafter Berne Convention]. Berne
is an international copyright convention that requires member-nations to
protect an artist's moral rights of paternity and integrity. Id. The artist can
prevent "any distortion, mutilation or other modification of... [the] work,
which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation." Id.; compare id. with
Berne, moral rights expire concurrently with the copyright term. Berne
Convention, supra, art. 6bis. In the alternative, member-nations may choose
to provide that the moral right will expire upon the artist's death. Id. The
convention was signed at Berne, Switzerland in 1886, and approximately 80
nations have joined as signatories. McNally, supra note 47, at 145. The U.S.
Congress adhered to the Convention in 1989. Id.

49. Wagner, supra note 9, at 688. Under French law, the artist or the
artist's heirs can enforce the moral right in perpetuity. Sarrute, supra note
46, at 483.

50. Wagner, supra note 9, at 688.

51. McDonough, supra note 28, at 468. There are two other significant
components of the moral right: the right of paternity or attribution and the
right of public disclosure. Sarrute, supra note 46, at 467. The right of
paternity allows the artist to claim authorship of a work of art. Id. Disclosure
is the artist's right to decide when a work is finished. Id. This right poses
particular problems with films and other works of collective authorship. Id. at
473. Since the artists may not agree on when the work is complete, one artist
could delay the exhibition of a collaborative work against the wishes of the co-
authors. Id. at 474. Concerned about the major financial investment required
for filmmaking, French lawmakers curtailed the moral right of disclosure for
film artists. Wagner, supra note 9, at 698.

52. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994) (granting a visual artist the right to
prevent intentional alterations that would have a negative impact on the
artist's reputation).

53. Wagner, supra note 9, at 690. Another rationale is that the artist
should retain some rights in a creative work because it is an extension of the
artist's personality. Id. at 689-90.
work, which in turn harms the artist’s reputation and subsequently lowers the pecuniary value of the artist’s creations.54 Moral rights thus protect the private interest of the artistic author.55 Any public benefit is incidental.56

Despite repeated calls by film artists and their supporters, Congress has declined to adopt moral rights protection for film artists.57 In 1988, the U.S. did become a signatory to the Berne Convention.58 However, the implementing legislation explicitly stated U.S. adherence to Berne did not expand an artistic author’s rights of attribution or integrity.59 Moral rights advocates were also disappointed when Congress did not enact the Film Integrity Act, which would have amended the Copyright Act to prohibit material alterations of films without the permission of the artistic author.60 Although the Visual Artists’ Rights Act (VARA) of 1990 granted limited moral rights protection to visual artists,61 it

54. Id. at 690.
55. Gerstenblith, supra note 12, at 438.
56. Id. at 439.
57. McDonough, supra note 28, at 472-73. Nevertheless, film artists and their supporters continue to seek federal moral rights legislation. See, e.g., id. at 458 (calling for new efforts to gain moral rights protection for film artists).
59. Id. § 3.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994). VARA gives visual artists the moral rights of paternity and integrity. Id. § 106A(a). Visual artists have the right to claim authorship of their own work and to prevent the misattribution to them of works they did not create. Id. The author of a work of visual art has the right to prevent any intentional “distortion, mutilation, or other modification” to the work that would have a negative impact on the artist’s “honor or reputation.” Id. The artist can also prevent the destruction of a work of “recognized stature.” Id. The author cannot prevent modifications that are the result “of the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials,” or that are the result of conservation or public display. Id. § 106A(c). The author cannot transfer his moral rights, but can waive them in an express, signed written instrument. Id. § 106A(e). An artist possesses moral rights under VARA regardless of whether the artist also owns the copyright, and selling a work of
specifically excluded film artists.\textsuperscript{62}

C. U.S. Protection of Cultural Property

Archaeological and historic objects, artistic and architectural works, and other objects that “embody the culture” constitute cultural property.\textsuperscript{63} Cultural objects serve a number of social functions.\textsuperscript{64} Cultural objects embody our cultural identity,\textsuperscript{65} carry our cultural memory,\textsuperscript{66} awaken a sense of community,\textsuperscript{67} and give us pleasure.\textsuperscript{68} The preservation of artistic works also stimulates contemporary artistic endeavors.\textsuperscript{69}

The preservation of historic buildings and districts is a powerful example of legal protection of cultural property in the United States.\textsuperscript{70} All fifty states and more than one thousand local art does not constitute a waiver of the rights. \textit{Id.} §§ 106A(b), (e). The term of protection endures for the life of the author. \textit{Id.} § 106A(d).

\textsuperscript{62} VARA applies to authors of “work[s] of visual art.” \textit{Id.} § 106A(a). Works of visual art include paintings, drawings, and sculpture. \textit{Id.} § 101. By definition, works of visual art do not include motion pictures or other works for hire. \textit{Id.}


\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Id.} at 346-49.


\textsuperscript{66} Merryman, \textit{supra} note 63, at 347. One of the purposes of VARA was to protect artistic works from distortions that “cheat the public of an accurate account of the culture of our time.” \textit{See Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1990, H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, at 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6916 (quoting sculptor Weltzin Blix).}

\textsuperscript{67} Merryman, \textit{supra} note 63, at 349. Cultural objects “communicate across time and distance.” \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Id.} at 354. Cultural property also gives us a feeling of truth and certainty through the emotional satisfaction we feel when we see an authentic artifact (“the real thing”). \textit{Id.} at 346. Cultural objects both create nostalgia for the past and constitute an archaeological record. \textit{Id.} at 346, 353.

\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Id.} at 353-54. Old works of art are the textbooks of new artists, and new artistic movements are often rebellions against the past. \textit{Id.} at 354.

\textsuperscript{70} Marilyn Phelan, \textit{A Synopsis of the Laws Protecting Our Cultural Heritage}, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 63, 107 (1993). The preservation movement has evolved in response to three theoretical rationales. Carol M. Rose, \textit{Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation}, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 479 (1981). The earliest was the conviction that historic landmarks have an inspirational value because they encourage people’s patriotism and civic pride. \textit{Id.} As emblems of the nation’s common past, monuments inspire a sense of national community. \textit{Id.} at 482. This rationale, epitomized by the movement to save Mount Vernon in Virginia and preserve it as a national monument, dominated the preservation movement in the nineteenth century. \textit{Id.} at 479-80. The desire to preserve buildings of significant artistic merit motivated the second wave of the preservation movement. \textit{Id.} at 480. Beyond the continued physical existence
governments have enacted historic preservation legislation.\textsuperscript{71} Congress has also recognized the important public interest in preservation.\textsuperscript{72} In particular, the National Historic Preservation Act articulates the cultural importance of our built environment.\textsuperscript{73}

1. The National Historic Preservation Act and the National Trust

The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1965 followed several other legislative efforts to protect important historical sites.\textsuperscript{74} In particular, Congress chartered the National Trust for Historic Preservation as a privately funded, non-profit

of the building, this rationale promotes the preservation of the "artistic integrity" of the structure, and, therefore, discourages non-historical alterations to the facade. \textit{Id.} The third rationale is that preservation of the physical environment helps to preserve local communities. \textit{Id.} at 480, 488. Preservationists contend that buildings exert a considerable psychological effect on people and that old, familiar buildings give people a "sense of identity and place." Nivala, \textit{supra} note 11, at 108; cf. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1994) (declaring that "the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved . . . in order to give a sense of orientation to the American people"). Preservation also maintains the physical integrity of neighborhoods. Rose, \textit{supra}, at 488. This conception of preservation has dominated the preservation movement over the past several decades. \textit{Id.} at 489.

\textsuperscript{71} Gerstenblith, \textit{supra} note 12, at 455. Local preservation efforts are frequently impelled by concern for property values. Tyler E. Chapman, \textit{Note, To Save and Save Not: The Historic Preservation Implication of the Property Rights Movement,} 77 B.U. L. REV. 111, 144 (1997). In Indianapolis, property values in a neighborhood designated as a historic district appreciated at a much greater rate over a 15-year period than property values in an adjacent, comparable neighborhood that did not have preservation designation. DONOVAN D. RYPKEMA, \textit{Preservation and Property Values in Indiana} 9 (1997). The study reported similar findings in other Indiana towns. \textit{Id.} at 1. There is also considerable anecdotal evidence that preservation raises property values. Chapman, \textit{supra}, at 144.

\textsuperscript{72} See \textit{infra} note 74 and accompanying text for further discussion of congressional recognition.

\textsuperscript{73} 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1994).

\textsuperscript{74} Phelan, \textit{supra} note 70, at 70. The Antiquities Act of 1906 was the first congressional act to protect historic landmarks. \textit{Id.} at 67. The Antiquities Act was, in part, a response to the looting of American Indian sites in the Southwest, as well as the popular movement to preserve Mount Vernon. \textit{Id.} The Antiquities Act authorized the President to designate selected landmarks of "historic or scientific interest" as national monuments. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994). National monuments established under the Act include Carlsbad Caverns, the Edison Laboratory, and the Statue of Liberty. \textit{Id.} The Act also penalized the destruction of antiquities on public lands. \textit{Id.} § 433. The Historic Sites, Buildings and Antiquities Act of 1935 declared that it is a national policy to preserve important sites for the benefit and inspiration of the public. \textit{Id.} § 461. The Historic Sites Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to acquire, restore, and maintain historic sites for public use and appreciation. \textit{Id.} § 462. National Historic Sites include Ford's Theatre, the Knife River Indian Villages, and the Vanderbilt Mansion. 16 U.S.C. § 461 (1985).
corporation in 1949.\textsuperscript{75} The National Trust acquires, preserves, and administers significant sites, buildings, and objects for the public benefit.\textsuperscript{76} The NHPA established a national register of historic sites, districts, and buildings significant to American history, architecture, archaeology, and culture.\textsuperscript{77} In a ringing endorsement of the important public interest in historic preservation, the NHPA described historic properties as part of an "irreplaceable heritage" providing a "vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, [and] economic" benefits.\textsuperscript{78} The NHPA encouraged broad public acceptance and support of preservation by conferring a new stature and legitimacy to the historic preservation movement.\textsuperscript{79}

2. Takings Challenges to Historic Preservation Laws

Some landowners resist historic preservation and attack preservation laws as unconstitutional takings of private property.\textsuperscript{80} In the landmark 1978 case of \textit{Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City}, the U.S. Supreme Court held historic preservation laws were constitutional.\textsuperscript{81} Most takings challenges focus on a

\textsuperscript{75} 16 U.S.C. § 468 (1994). Congress created the National Trust to further the policies of the Historic Sites Act. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Id.} The NHPA authorized federal grants to the National Trust to preserve historic sites for the public benefit. \textit{Id.} § 470-1.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Id.} § 470a.

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Id.} § 470.

\textsuperscript{79} Scott H. Rothstein, \textit{Comment, Takings Jurisprudence Comes in From the Cold: Preserving Interiors Through Landmark Designation}, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1994). In particular, the National Register of Historic Places focuses public attention on the historic significance and artistic merit of individual buildings. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{80} The U.S. Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation," U.S. CONST. amend. V. State and lower federal courts regularly uphold preservation statutes, finding that preservation serves diverse public purposes. Rothstein, \textit{supra} note 79, at 1106. Preservation encourages economic growth, tourism, education, historical values, and neighborhood quality. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City}, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1976). \textit{Penn Central} is the leading case in the area of takings challenges to historic preservation laws. Rothstein, \textit{supra} note 79, at 1113. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the New York City landmarks ordinance based on a two-pronged analysis. \textit{Penn Central}, 438 U.S. at 138. First, the Court analyzed the public interest in historic preservation, finding that the ordinance was "substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare." \textit{Id.} Preservation enhances the quality of life because historic buildings "embody precious features of our heritage, [and] serve as examples of quality for today." \textit{Id.} at 108. Second, the Court analyzed the economic effect of the ordinance on the individual landowner. \textit{Id.} at 130-37. The economic analysis focuses on the regulation's effect on the value of the property as a whole, rather than its effect on a discrete segment of the property. \textit{Id.} at 130-31. The Court
regulation's economic impact on the individual landowner, while conceding that historic preservation serves a public purpose.\textsuperscript{53}

Since \textit{Penn Central}, the Supreme Court has decided several takings cases based on challenges to land-use regulations.\textsuperscript{53} A regulation is unconstitutional if it fails to substantially advance a legitimate state interest,\textsuperscript{54} if there is no "nexus" between the governmental interest and the restriction,\textsuperscript{55} or if the regulation denies the landowner all economically viable use of the property.\textsuperscript{56} Preservation statutes would survive a renewed constitutional challenge under the post-\textit{Penn Central} line of land-use cases.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{D. The National Film Preservation Act}

Congress recognized the important public interest in film preservation with the enactment of the National Film Preservation Act (NFPA).\textsuperscript{58} The primary purpose of the Act is to preserve films for future generations.\textsuperscript{59} The NFPA also established a National Film Registry to maintain and preserve "films that are determined that Penn Central Co. was not unjustly burdened, since the ordinance did not limit the existing uses of the property or prevent the company from realizing a "reasonable return" on its investment. \textit{Id.} at 136. A regulation is not a taking simply because it does not impose uniform burdens on all landowners: "[l]egislation designed to promote the general welfare commonly burdens some more than others." \textit{Id.} at 133. The dissenting opinion argued that the New York ordinance was unduly burdensome because, in addition to use restrictions, it imposed an affirmative duty on landowners to maintain their properties at their own expense. \textit{Id.} at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

82. Rothstein, \textit{supra} note 79, at 1106-07. In \textit{Penn Central}, Penn Central Co. conceded that preservation was a legitimate public goal. \textit{Penn Central}, 438 U.S. at 129. The Court discussed the issue anyway, noting that every state, many local governments, and the federal government have all recognized the importance of historic preservation. \textit{Id.} at 107-08.

83. \textit{See generally} Nivala, \textit{supra} note 11, at 94-99 (determining that \textit{Penn Central} would be decided the same way in light of subsequent developments in Supreme Court takings jurisprudence).


culturally, historically, or aesthetically significant." Inclusion in the Film Registry signifies that a film has become "an enduring part of our national cultural heritage." The NFPA, in turn, conferred a new status on films by recognizing their importance as cultural landmarks.

Congress established the National Film Preservation Foundation in 1996 as a private, charitable, non-profit corporation. The Film Foundation has the usual powers of a corporation, including the power to administer property and bring suit. The Film Foundation was chartered to further the protection, preservation, and accessibility of American films "for the benefit of present and future generations of Americans."

E. NFPA and NHPA: Protection of Cultural Landmarks

Films, like historic buildings, are an important part of the nation's cultural heritage. Congress recognized the public interest in preserving our film heritage in the NFPA and our built environment in the NHPA. The acts are strikingly similar in purpose and effect. Both recognize the strong public interest in protecting cultural property and confer a new status on buildings and films as cultural landmarks.

The NHPP begins with a congressional finding that "the spirit and direction of the Nation are founded upon and reflected in its historic heritage." The preservation of that heritage for the benefit of future generations is in the public interest. Similarly,
the NFPA declares that "it is appropriate and necessary for the Federal Government to recognize motion pictures as a significant American art form deserving of protection." Each act contains provisions authorizing the national government to assist and encourage public and private preservation efforts. Congress also established two private, non-profit organizations to aid in preservation efforts: the National Trust and the Film Foundation.

In addition, the NHPA and the NFPA encourage public appreciation of our historic heritage through the establishment of national registers. The National Register and the Film Registry recognize culturally and historically significant buildings and films. The registries educate the public about the nation's past by identifying a diverse range of buildings and films as cultural landmarks.

II. LEGAL PROTECTION OF FILMS THROUGH CULTURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Preservation and protection of America's film heritage is an important public interest. Cinema is the preeminent art form of the twentieth century. American movies enjoy enormous popularity and success domestically and internationally. They help shape American popular culture, influencing how people in

103. See 16 U.S.C. § 468 (1994) (establishing National Trust to further the policies of the Historic Sites Act, a legislative precursor to the NHPA); 36 U.S.C. § 5701 (Supp. 1997) (establishing Film Foundation to further the policies of the NFPA).
108. MAST, supra note 40, at 7. The early filmmakers first overcame major technical and financial difficulties, then the disdain of the educated and social elite. Id. at 5, 7.
109. See id. at 94-95 (stating American films have dominated world cinema since the end of World War I). The average American movie is technically and artistically superior to the average product of any of the major foreign film industries. Id. at 7.
other countries view Americans and how Americans see
to them. Further, films have great emotional power as works
of art; they have “educated, entertained, and enthralled Americans
and the world.”

Films are a unique record of American history. Individual
films record the realities of contemporary life and reflect society’s
preoccupations and attitudes. An altered version of a film is a
distortion of American history and a misrepresentation of
American culture.

We need a new approach if we are to protect America’s film
heritage. Protection must be permanent, must prevent all
alterations, and must not rely on the discretion of an individual
rights holder. Legal protection of films based on society’s cultural
property rights satisfies all three requirements.

A. Copyright Law and Moral Rights Theory Will Not Protect
America’s Film Heritage

The development of digital technology poses a serious threat
to the integrity of America’s film heritage. A copyright owner is
free to alter a copyrighted work in any way. Even if the owner
refuses to alter the film, copyright law provides no protection after
the film has entered the public domain. Moral rights theory is
also inherently inadequate to prevent alterations to classic films.

1. Copyright Law

Copyright law does not provide an effective means of
safeguarding America’s film heritage for two reasons. First, a

Dr. James Billington: “[t]hroughout its history, film has been a powerful force
in American culture and national life, often shaping our very notion of
contemporary events”).
112. Colorization: The Arguments Against, 17 J. ARTS MGMT. & L. 79, 84
(1987) [hereinafter Colorization] (director Sydney Pollack stating: “films are a
part of our cultural history. Like all accurate representations of who and what
we were, they deserve preservation in their authentic form. . . . We need an
accurate understanding of the past in order to point us accurately toward the
future”).
113. MAST, supra note 40, at 5. The history of American film is also a
history of American culture: movies are an explicit visual and dramatic record
of our culture, as well as vehicles for the implicit affirmation of values and
beliefs. Id.
114. David J. Kohs, Paint Your Wagon—Please!: Colorization, Copyright,
and the Search for Moral Rights, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 36 (1988). Cultural
objects are meaningful because they are genuine; counterfeit “falsify history
[and] misrepresent the culture.” Merryman, supra note 63, at 359.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 21-24 for further discussion.
117. Kohs, supra note 114, at 11.
copyright has a limited term.\footnote{118} Any perpetual term would violate the express language of the Copyright Clause.\footnote{119} However, films must have perpetual protection if they are to be preserved for the benefit of future generations. Many films, particularly from the silent period, are in the public domain and, therefore, already outside the realm of copyright law.\footnote{120}

Second, copyright holders can alter films at their discretion.\footnote{121} Since films are classified as works for hire, the studio that produced the film owns the copyright.\footnote{122} The studio has an immediate economic interest in digital alteration and, unlike the artist, no emotional attachment to the work.\footnote{123} For example, film owners frequently alter films to accommodate the demands of television broadcast through time compression, content editing, and panning and scanning. Protection subject to the whim of an individual copyright owner fails to fairly represent society's interest.

2. Moral Rights Theory

U.S. recognition of moral rights for film artists cannot protect our film heritage from alteration. First, moral rights are not perpetual since, like copyright, the moral right has a limited term.\footnote{124} For example, the moral rights of visual artists under VARA expire when the artist dies.\footnote{125} Expanding VARA to include film artists would fail to provide even temporary protection for many films. Contemporary recognition of the moral rights of film artists would come too late to protect silent films, and many sound films are already in the public domain.


\footnote{119} See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting to Congress the power to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings”). The limited term of copyright promotes public access to works of art. NIMMER, supra note 34, § 1.05[D], at 66.16-.17. Perpetual protection of our film heritage for the benefit of future generations would lose much of its meaning in the absence of public access.

\footnote{120} See supra note 40 and accompanying text for further discussion.

\footnote{121} See Honicky, supra note 15, at 429 (discussing the ability of copyright owners to make unrestricted alterations to copyrighted work).

\footnote{122} See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (classifying films as works for hire); id. § 201(b) (designating the employer who commissioned the work as the author of a work for hire).

\footnote{123} Wagner, supra note 9, at 629.

\footnote{124} See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 48, art. 6bis (setting the moral right term concurrent with the copyright term).

\footnote{125} See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d) (1994) (setting the term of moral rights protection for visual artists at the life of the artist). Although French law recognizes a perpetual moral right, this is a minority position in international law. Sarraute, supra note 46, at 483. Under Berne, the duration of the moral right is concurrent with the copyright term. Berne Convention, supra note 48, art. 6bis.
films as well. 126

Second, legal recognition of moral rights does not require artists to exercise those rights to prevent alterations. 127 Third, even if the artist wishes to preserve the integrity of a work of art out of emotional attachment or in order to preserve the artist’s reputation, 128 the artist may not be able to do so. The moral right only empowers the artist to prevent substantial changes to the work. 129 Many alterations that digital technology makes possible could fall outside the definition of a “substantial alteration.” 130 Yet, any digital alteration to a film is an assault on the integrity of our film heritage because it destroys the historic truth of the film. 131

In addition to its limited duration and scope, moral rights theory is inherently unsuited to film production. Filmmaking is a collaborative process involving many artists and technicians. 132 Principal artists include, among others, the screenwriter, director, and cinematographer. 133 Films rarely have a single creative “author” in who would vest the moral right. 134 Recognizing the

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126. Since the silent era ended in 1929, there are few silent era filmmakers living today, and many filmmakers from the early sound years are also deceased.

127. Filmmakers who advocate U.S. recognition of moral rights are primarily concerned with asserting the continued authority of the artist, particularly the director, to control whether or not a film is altered, not with preventing all alterations. See, e.g., Colorization, supra note 112, at 80 (quoting director Woody Allen: “if a movie director wishes his film to be colorized, then I say by all means, let him color it”).

128. See id. at 89 (quoting director Elliot Silverstein: “our sensibilities are acutely bruised when we see ‘our children’ publicly tortured and butchered on television by the various instruments of the new technologists”).

129. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (granting a visual artist the right to prevent a material alteration to a work of art that would have a negative impact on the artist’s reputation).

130. For example, a court might consider product placement to be an insignificant alteration, or the deletion of racist dialogue to be more likely to enhance than to harm the artist’s reputation.

131. See Wagner, supra note 9, at 630 (arguing that altering a film inevitably diminishes its value as a historical document); see also Honicky, supra note 15, at 429 (noting that minor changes can have a major cumulative effect on a film’s meaning); cf. Colorization, supra note 112, at 85 (stating that a colorized version of a film is a qualitatively different film than the original).

132. See MAST, supra note 40, at 3 (describing the collaborative nature of film production).

133. Id. While some critics subscribe to the auteur theory, which identifies the director as the “author” of the film, this theory is generally incompatible with the reality of film production. Id. at 3; see generally Köhs, supra note 114, at 13-14 (finding a degree of symmetry in the fact that the auteur and moral rights theories both originated in France).

134. See Wagner, supra note 9, at 695-96 (describing a French moral rights statute which grants authorship rights in a film to five artists); cf. Renberg, supra note 60, at 409 (discussing criticisms of Film Integrity Act’s identification of the director and principal screenwriter as the authors of a
moral rights of more than one contributing artist carries the
danger that the artists could take adverse positions in exercising
their rights, and thus "paralyze" the collaborative process.\textsuperscript{135}

Even if moral rights proponents could surmount the practical
difficulties of adapting the theory to film production, they would
still need to convince Congress to extend moral rights protection to
film artists.\textsuperscript{136} Two major concerns form the basis for the hostility
towards recognizing a moral right of film artists. First, militant
directors or other film artists, empowered by moral rights
legislation, could disrupt the film industry.\textsuperscript{137} Second, the moral
right is a limitation on the copyright, since it recognizes
concurrent rights over the work of art in someone other than the
copyright holder.\textsuperscript{138} For instance, the "author" of a film could
prevent the copyright owner from digitally re-writing the ending of
the film to provide a happy ending in place of a tragic one.\textsuperscript{139} The
copyright serves the important public function of encouraging
artistic creativity, while the moral right merely protects an artist's
personal interest.\textsuperscript{140} To date, despite repeated lobbying efforts by
segments of the film community, Congress has been unwilling to
abridge the copyright by recognizing the moral rights of film
artists.\textsuperscript{141}

B. Cultural Property Rights Will Protect America's Film Heritage

Society's cultural property rights, unlike copyright and the
moral right, can protect films from digital alteration. First,
because society has a continuing interest in preserving its heritage
for future generations, cultural property rights protect a work of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[135.] Sarraute, \textit{supra} note 46, at 473-74.
\item[136.] \textit{See} 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994) (recognizing the moral rights of visual
artists only).
\item[137.] \textit{See} Sandrine Cahn \& Daniel Schimmel, \textit{The Cultural Exception: Does it
Exist in GATT and GATS Frameworks? How Does it Affect or is it Affected by
the Agreement on TRIPS?}, 15 CARDOZO ARTS \& ENT. L.J. 281, 281-82 (1997)
(reporting that the audiovisual industry was the country's second largest
export industry in 1997, after the aerospace industry). In 1996, the film
industry collected $5.9 billion at the box office and $16.3 billion from video
sales and rentals. \textit{Where Were You 10 Years Ago?}, PREMIERE, Oct. 1997, at 39,
40.
\item[138.] \textit{See} Wagner, \textit{supra} note 9, at 656, 688 (explaining that the studio is the
legal author of the film for purposes of copyright law while the moral right is
held by the artistic author).
\item[139.] \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (granting visual artists the right to prevent a
material alteration to a work of art).
\item[140.] \textit{See} Gerstenblith, \textit{supra} note 12, at 439 (contrasting the copyright,
which primarily serves the public interest, with the moral right, which
protects the individual artist).
\item[141.] \textit{See generally} McDonough, \textit{supra} note 28, at 457-58 (discussing film
artists' failed efforts to gain moral rights protection).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
art for as long as the work is extant and the statute that guards the work is in force. Second, because they are public rights, public agencies enforce cultural property rights. Accordingly, enforcement does not depend on the discretion of individual rights holders. Lastly, cultural property protection can prevent all alterations to a work.

Society has a tripartite interest in the arts: creation, dissemination, and preservation. The copyright, though a private property right, exists to serve the public interest in artistic creativity. Further, the Constitution limits the term of protection to ensure public access to works of art. Additionally, Congress has recognized the strong public interest in the preservation of our cultural heritage with the enactment of the NFPA and NHPA.

Historic preservation laws are a significant restriction on the rights of landowners, preventing property owners from altering buildings in ways that would damage their historical integrity. This restriction recognizes and effectuates the public interest in the preservation of our built environment. Public interest in preservation, not the architect's moral right of integrity, justifies

142. Telephone Interview with George W. Geib, President, Indianapolis Historic Preservation Commission (Jan. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Geib Interview].
143. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 79, at 1109 (describing authority of preservation commissions to preserve historic buildings).
144. Historic preservation laws typically permit landowners to make reasonable alterations to buildings in order to maintain and adapt them for normal use. Geib Interview, supra note 142. For instance, landowners can make repairs using non-historical materials if the original materials are difficult to obtain or prohibitively expensive. Id. Landowners can also build additions if the design of the new construction does not alter the fundamental character of the historic structure. Id. People need a degree of regulatory flexibility because they live and work in buildings. Id. The analogy between films and buildings ends at this point, since there is no corresponding necessity to alter films.
145. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (holding that the primary purpose of the copyright is to serve the public interest by encouraging artistic creativity).
146. See NIMMER, supra note 34, § 1.05[D], at 66.16-17 (explaining that the limited term of copyright promotes the public interest of access).
148. Geib Interview, supra note 142; see also Rothstein, supra note 79, at 1110 (reporting that over 80% of local preservation commissions have authority to review changes to building exteriors, over 50% can refuse to grant demolition permits, and over 60% can review building plans for new construction). The Indianapolis Preservation Commission, which is representative of urban preservation efforts, has all three powers. Geib Interview, supra note 142.
preservation laws; only the public interest in preservation will take precedence over landowners' property rights.149

Society has a corresponding interest in preserving the historic integrity of its film heritage.150 This public interest in preservation justifies limiting the private property interest of the copyright holder. The copyright is already constrained by society's first two interests in the arts: the copyright exists to encourage the creation of art and its term is limited to ensure public access.151 Prohibiting the digital alteration of films will promote preservation, the third important public interest in the arts.

While such a prohibition would greatly benefit the public, the corresponding limitation on the copyright owner would be minor. A prohibition on alterations does not abridge the copyright holder's right to copy, sell, perform, and display the work.152 The restriction only slightly limits the right to prepare derivative works; the copyright owner can still produce new works based on the copyrighted work, such as a "remake" or "novelisation." Increased preservation efforts may themselves be of long-term economic benefit to the film industry, since public recognition of the cultural importance and artistic merit of classic films would likely create greater consumer interest in those films.153

III. AMEND THE NFPA TO PROHIBIT DIGITAL ALTERATIONS TO AMERICAN FILMS

Society has a great interest in preserving the authenticity of its film heritage. Amending the NFPA to prohibit digital alterations to American films will safeguard America's film heritage for the benefit of our own and future generations. The protection must be perpetual in duration and must prohibit all changes to the films.154 Protection must extend to all films, not just a few great ones. Minor artistic works also teach us about our history, and we will have a deeper understanding of the great works if we also understand the context in which they were

149. See Gerstenblith, supra note 12, at 462-64 (concluding that historic preservation laws based on the public interest in preservation provide a better means of saving historic buildings than recognition of architects' moral rights).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98 (comparing NFPA and NHPA).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 32 & 34 and accompanying text for further discussion.
152. Cf. Gerstenblith, supra note 12, at 458 (noting that historic preservation laws prohibit alterations to buildings, but allow prior use to continue).
154. Granting protected status to films on an individual basis will inevitably allow important works to be altered because they were not protected in time. Cf. Gerstenblith, supra note 12, at 464 (noting that landmarking is a slow process; many important buildings have been destroyed while they awaited landmark protection).
made.  

Film owners argue that preventing alterations to films interferes with the right of consumers to choose the version they prefer. However, this is a hollow protest. For all but the most famous films, film owners will only market the version in which they have the greatest financial investment. Since the public does not have the option of renting the film from an archive, the only choices will be to watch the film in its altered version or not at all.

The NFPA is an appropriate platform for this proposed legislation. The NFPA is a strong statement of the public interest in protecting America's film heritage. Currently, the NFPA's primary purposes are to encourage the physical preservation of films and to increase public appreciation of, and access to, older films. A prohibition on digital alterations complements the NFPA's program of physical preservation. The Film Foundation can assume the responsibility of enforcing the act. The Film Foundation's mandate is to further the policies of the NFPA, and this organization has the necessary corporate powers, including the power to bring suit.

The following is a proposed statutory language model:

No one, including the copyright owner, shall digitally alter an American feature film after its first publication. A "digital alteration" includes, but is not limited to, the addition of new images or sounds, the deletion of existing images or sounds, and the manipulation of existing images or sounds through digital technology. Archival restoration that attempts to restore a film to the condition it was in at its first publication

155. Cf. Geib Interview, supra note 142 (explaining that modern preservation efforts focus on protecting the setting as well as the individual landmark). The Indianapolis preservation ordinance protects 10 historic districts, and only two individual landmarks. Id.


158. Id. Film owners also argue that they should have the same freedom to alter films as filmmakers have to alter novels or plays when producing film adaptations. See, e.g., Arguments for Colorization, supra note 156, at 66 (stating that filmmakers constantly alter their sources when producing film adaptations). This argument has a flawed premise. A film adaptation of a novel does not re-write the novel itself. Anna Karenina could live happily ever after in a thousand film adaptations, but she will always die at the end of Tolstoy's novel. Altering the ending of Casablanca would be akin to re-writing the ending of Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter.

159. Federal legislation to protect films is appropriate, given the national character of film production, marketing, and distribution. Wagner, supra note 9, at 712-13.


is excluded from the scope of this Act.

The NFPA defines "film" and "publication." Since the amendment applies only after a film's initial release, it does not affect film production. Digital alteration does not include changes that are made by employing different technologies. For instance, alterations for the purpose of television broadcast, such as the insertion of commercials, time compression, and content editing, are excluded. Likewise, traditional methods of restoration are excluded because they rely on standard film editing techniques. The amendment excludes the small class of digital alterations made in the course of archival restorations, as the purpose of those alterations is to return the film to its original condition. These changes are made in the service of preserving films in their authentic form.

This legislation would withstand a takings challenge brought by a copyright owner. The amendment serves a legitimate public purpose in protecting the integrity of our film heritage. There is a close nexus between the goal and the means: the public interest in the preservation of films in their authentic form will be effectuated by prohibiting alterations to those films. Finally, the proposed amendment does not deny the film owner all

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162. "Film" means a "motion picture" as defined in section 101 of title 17, except that it excludes works that were not originally fixed on film stock. 2 U.S.C. § 179u (Supp. 1997). "Publication" means "publication" as defined in section 101 of title 17. Id. "Publication is the distribution of copies . . . of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).

163. Cf. Wagner, supra note 9, at 709 (noting that moral rights under the Film Integrity Act were to vest after publication of the film, thus avoiding potential conflicts with the production process).

164. Similarly, the amendment excludes "director's cuts." In an attempt to re-create the artist's cut, a director's cut re-integrates original film footage that was not included in the final cut released in theaters. See RALPH S. SINGLETON, FIMMAKE R'S DICTIONARY 48, 63 (1986) (defining "director's cut" as "[t]he director's version of the completed picture containing his audio and visual selections," and "final cut" as "[t]he finished version of the workprint to which the negative is conformed in order to strike the release prints that will be shown in theaters"). Archival restoration typically re-creates the final cut. In contrast to digital alteration, neither process creates new images or manipulates existing ones.

165. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (stating that the first test of validity is whether the regulation serves a legitimate public purpose).

166. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (holding that a regulation effects a taking when there is no nexus between the purposes of the legislation and the restriction on the property owner); cf. Nivala, supra note 11, at 108 (noting that the means of historic preservation, the prohibition of alterations, are essential to the end, the preservation of historic integrity).
The copyright owner will still realize a reasonable return on his investment. The film owner may broadcast, sell, and otherwise exploit the film. In addition, no affirmative obligation is imposed on the film owner to physically preserve the film. The statute would only prevent the owner from destroying the film's authenticity.

CONCLUSION

Filmmaker Martin Scorsese, an ardent supporter of film preservation, has described the importance of America's film heritage: "Film is history. With every foot of film that is lost, we lose a link to our culture, to the world around us, to each other, and to ourselves." Digitally altering a film, whatever the motive, destroys a piece of America's cultural heritage and deprives us of another link to our past. Films, like historic buildings, are national treasures. We must protect them.

167. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (holding that there is a taking when the property owner is deprived of all economically viable use of the property).
